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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
8TA:TEMENT OF FAGTS 
The Statement of Facts as set forth in the Plaintiffs' 
Brief is substantially in accordance with Defendant's under-
standing and hence nothing is added thereto. 
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2 
STATE:MENT OF POINTS INVOLVED 
Although the Plaintiffs have set forth their arguments 
under four points, it appears to us that these points es-
sentially narrow themselves down to two, to wit : 
POINT NO. I. 
SECTION 42.-1-81, U. C. A., 1943, IS CONSTITU-
TIONAL AS A PROPER EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE 
POWER. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY 
OR OAPRIGIOUSLY OR IN ABUSE OF !TIS DISCRE- , ~ 
TION IN FIXING A FEE OF THREE HUNDRED 
SEVENTY-FIVE ($375.00) DOLL,ARS. 
ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I. 
S·EOTION 42-1-81, U. C. A., 1943, IS 'CONST1TU-
TIONAL AS A PROPER EXERCISE OF LEGISLAT~IVE 
POWER. 
Section 42-1-81, U. C. A., 1943, reads as follows: 
"In all cases coming before the industrial com-
mission in which attorneys have been employed, the 
commission is vested with full power to regulate and 
fix the fees of such attorneys." 
Statutes similar to ours above quoted have on numerous 
occasions been questioned as regards the constitutionality 
thereof. In every case which we have been able to find 
.J: ~' 111111 
I' 
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3 
where the constitutionality of such a statute was questioned, 
it has been held without exception that such statutes are 
, constitutional. 
In the case of Buckler vs. Hilt (Ind.) 200 N. E. 219, 
the Court held that the Indiana statute which provided for 
the fixing of attorneys' fees by the Industrial Board of 
;-- Indiana was valid and not a denial of due process of law 
' nor a taking of property without just compensation, since it 
falls within police power. The case further held that such 
act was not unconstitutional as denying liberty of contract 
and depriving the attorney of compensation for property 
without due process of law, nor was it an unconstitutional 
grant of special privileges or immunities by imposing re-
strictions upon attorneys practicing before the board differ-
ing from those imposed upon attorneys generally. 
This Court in the case of Ellis vs. Industrial Commission, 
91 Utah 432, 64 Pac. (2d) 363, after thorough consideration 
of the matter and a review of authorities from other juris-
dictions, held that the statute in question was valid and that 
the Industrial Commission of Utah had the authority to fix 
attorneys' fees in matters under the jurisdiction of that 
commission. 
The ruling in the Ellis case was bolstered and reiterated 
in re Hatch, 108 Utah 446, 160 Pac. (2d) 961. 
We feel that the rulings in the two cases above cited and 
previously decided by this Court are in themselves sufficient 
to sustain the position that the statute is constitutional and 
valid without further argument or citation of authorities. 
In order, however, to call the attention of the Court to the 
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uniformity of the decisions in connection with this matter 
we quote from the annotation in 69 A. L. R. at Page 1319, 
which reads as follows: 
"Provisions of the act limiting the amounts 
which attorneys may charge claimants for services 
in connection with their claims, as, by requiring that 
such a charge must be approved by the board or 
commission to which is intrusted the administration 
of the act, or by a judge, have been held constitu-
tional whenever questioned, upon the ground that 
they are a valid exercise of the police power, as well 
as upon other grounds." 
The annotation from which the above quotation is taken 
and a subsequent annotation in 103 A. L. R., Page 906 et 
seq. cite and discuss numerous cases upholding the validity 
of such statutes. No case is cited therein, nor do we find 
any cases where such statutes have been held unconstitu- ~~ 
tional. 
Counsel for Plaintiff asserts that the act in question I 
contravenes Article V, 'Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah 
in that it is an attempt by the legislature to permit the 
executive or administrative arm of the state to interfere ·:: 
with the State's judiciary. Counsel predicates this argu- :1 
ment upon the fact that attorneys are officers of the :Court 
and no one except the Courts of the state would have the 
right to dictate the terms upon which counsel might act. 
We call attention to the case of Yeiser vs. Dysart, 267 
U. S. 540, 45 Supreme Court 399, 400, 69 Lawyers Edition 
775, quoted with approval in Ellis vs. Industrial Commission, 
supra, as follows : 
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"When we add the considerations that an at-
torney practises under a license from the State and 
that the subject-matter is a right created by statute 
it is obvious that the State may attach such con-
ditions to the license in respect of such matters as 
it believes to be necessary in order to make it a 
public good." 
We submit further that, in appearing before the In-
~. dustrial Commission, which is a quasi judicial body of the 
State of Utah, that attorneys are officers of the commission 
and by so appearing subject themselves to the rules and 
regulations of the commission, and particularly such rules 
and regulations as have been provided by statute. 
In view of the foregoing we submit that the statute 
in question is constitutional and that the commission acted 
within its jurisdiction in fixing the attorneys' fees in this 
matter. 
ARGUMENT II. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY 
OR CAPRICIOUSLY OR IN ABUSE OF ITS DISCRE-
TION IN F'IXING A FEE OF THREE HUNDRED 
SEVENTY -FIVE ($375.00) DOLLARS. 
We find it difficult as attorneys, to argue that the fee 
allowed by the Industrial Commission in this matter was 
adequate and in line with the services rendered by the 
Plaintiffs. If the pre~ailing opinion in the Ellis case means 
that the commission can determine the fee merely upon the 
record in the case and without any independent evidence 
on the question of the value of the attorneys' services, even 
where request is made to permit the production of such 
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6 
evidence, then probably it can be said that the commission 
had before it sufficient information upon which to act and 
that there is nothing before this Court from which it could 
be said that the commission acted arbitrarily and cap-
riciously. 
On the other hand, it appears clear that no hearing 
was had or given to the Plaintiffs on the specific question 
as to the reasonableness of the fee which should be awarded 
for the services rendered. There are authorities to the ' 
effect that a proper and constitutional administration of a j 
statute such as ours require the opportunity for a hearinJJ 
on the question as to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, 
particularly where such a hearing is requested. See Shilling 
vs. Industrial Accident Commission (Cal.) 190 Pac. 3'73.' 
See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in the Ellis case. 
Under all of the circumstances and in the light of the : 
authorities and good reason, we are inclined to feel that the 
better rule would require the commission to grant to the 
attorneys an opportunity to be heard on the question of 
reasonableness of fees in compensation cases. In this respect, 
in order to be honest with this Court in the presentation of 
our views to it, we must confess that in our opinion the In-
dustrial Commission abused its authority and discretion in 
fixing the fees in this case without permitting the Plain-
tiffs an opportunity to present evidence with regard thereto. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER, A. GILES, 
Attorney General, 
ZAR E. HAYES, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
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